Bi-Logic and Multi-Modal Argumentation: Understanding Emotional Arguments

According to Bi-logic theory, there are two logics operating in the mind. One is traditional logic, and the other one is called “symmetrical”, because it does not respect asymmetrical relations. Bi-logic assumes that mental processes involve combinations of both logics in different proportions. From that perspective, Michael Gilbert’s theory of Multi-Modal argumentation is discussed focusing upon emotional arguments. It is claimed that these arguments are bi-logical, that is, they contain a combination of traditional and symmetrical logics

Revisiting Emotional Arguments in the Context of Western Culture.

In the context of cornerstone ideas of Western Culture, this paper focuses on the issue of why emotional arguments are studied and evaluated from the perspective of logic. Two other issues are briefly considered: whether logical and emotional arguments could/should be examined from the perspective of emotions

Levels of Depth in Deep Disagreement

The concept of deep disagreement was introduced by Richard Fogelin in a 1985 paper published in Critical Thinking. Since then, about 12 papers have been published in journals or presented in conferences on argumentation theory. All these papers relate back to the initial Fogelin paper. Andrew Lugg’s 1986 critical response to Fogelin introduces significant questions concerning his views. Peter Davson-Galle in 1992, takes a more positive approach to them. The more extensive publication on deep disagreement can be found in a 2005 issue of Critical Thinking dedicated entirely to this topic. Most of the 5 papers found here take a positive approach and introduce a challenging set of issues. Two papers presented later on, one in the 2007 OSSA Conference by Vesel Memedi, and the other one by David Zarefsky in the 2010 ISSA Conference, discuss the question of resolving deep disagreement. This proposed paper intends to draw specifically from the last two papers mentioned above, especially the one by Zarefsky, in order to introduce the notion of “levels of depth” in deep disagreement. Since Fogelin’s 1985 paper, deep disagreement seems to have been understood in rather absolute terms not allowing for differences in “depth” in cases of deep disagreement

Androcentrism as a fallacy of argumentation

The deep operation of androcentrism in scientific argumentation demands recognition as a form of fallacy. On Walton’s (1995) account, fallacies are serious mistakes in argumentation that employ presumptions acceptable in other circumstances. There are only isolated cases in which androcentric pre-sumptions are acceptable, and I argue that androcentrism affects an overarching theme of generalization in science rather than an isolated scheme. Androcentrism is related to other ways of treating privileged people as exemplary humans, whose negative impact on processes of argumentation can be described as the fallacy of “appeal to the standard.

Diversity in Argumentation Theory

There is still a high degree of expectation that argumentation should be understood from the perspective of the logical mode of reasoning with little attention to intuitions, emotions and physicality. Our proposal intends to develop a comprehensive understanding of argumentation from the perspective of Michael Gilbert’s Theory of Multi-Modal Argumentation. This approach allows the introduction of diversity in Argumentation Theory, investigating in depth the relations between logic, intuitions, emotions and physicality in cases of argumentation

Memory loss in Alzheimer's disease: are the alterations in the UPR network involved in the cognitive impairment?

Artículo de publicación ISIThis work was funded by the Alzheimer Disease Association, Millennium Institute no. P09-015-F, FONDECYT no. 1100176, ACT1109; CONICYT grant USA2013-0003, ECOS-CONICYTC13S02 and FONDEF D11I1007 (Claudio Hetz), Doctoral Fellow supported by CONICYT (Gabriela Martínez) and FONDECYT grant no. 3140466 (Claudia Duran-Aniotz)

A posteriori error estimates for non-conforming approximation of eigenvalue problems

We consider the approximation of eigenvalue problem for the Laplacian by the Crouzeix– Raviart non-conforming finite elements in two and three dimensions. Extending known techniques for source problems, we introduce a posteriori error estimators for eigenvectors and eigenvalues. We prove that the error estimator is equivalent to the energy norm of the eigenvector error up to higher order terms. Moreover, we prove that our estimator provides an upper bound for the error in the approximation of the first eigenvalue, also up to higher order terms. We present numerical examples of an adaptive procedure based on our error estimator in two and three dimensions. These examples show that the error in the adaptive procedure is optimal in terms of the number of degrees of freedom.Fil: Dari, Enzo Alberto. Comisión Nacional de Energía Atómica. Centro Atómico Bariloche; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; ArgentinaFil: Duran, Ricardo Guillermo. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Oficina de Coordinación Administrativa Ciudad Universitaria. Instituto de Investigaciones Matemáticas "Luis A. Santaló". Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Ciencias Exactas y Naturales. Instituto de Investigaciones Matemáticas "Luis A. Santaló"; ArgentinaFil: Padra, Claudio. Comisión Nacional de Energía Atómica. Centro Atómico Bariloche; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentin